dougwg
Regular Member
imported post
Yes or no
Please do not include "well if they added this or took away that..."
Simple, yes or no.
Yes or no
Please do not include "well if they added this or took away that..."
Simple, yes or no.
If I answer "yes" to the poll would I be answering to the "for" or "against" option?
The way I read it my answer might say "no, I am for or against these bills." :?
Bronson
i have no idea what A2 is....Oh, you must be referring to A2.
i think i get you,,, the proposed rewrite that allows getting the PPP as a not requiredAmendmnt 2
There exists the problem of carrying in other states without a CPL, but I guess I would handle the state as I would handle any other buisiness that refused to recognise my rights. I dont go there.
how about a "license to have and carry", that replaces the pistol purchase permit.
it would be free, it would be quick to get, and it would be shall issue.
i would replace the PPP, but not the CPL.
it would allow OC in PFZs just like a CPL.
you would only need to get it once, instead of everytime you buy a gun.
doing this would negate the need to overhaul all the other gun laws you have in Michigan.
preserving all the good stuff, but not making any more bad stuff.
READ THIS ENTIRE DECISION (Excerpts below) United States v Tait (2000)
http://openjurist.org/202/f3d/1320/united-states-v-tait
It seems that even if the permit to purchase is done away with If Michigan law is okay with it, then the feds are too. I would love for people to comment on this. I know of a few attorneys that stated the even now Michigan doesn't qualify for the exemption (ii). I bet they haven't seen this case law
This case answerstwo questions. Oneof whether a Michigan purchase permit counts for exemption (ii). Seems it does. Also it addresses the question that has come up before. If Michigan expunges a felony under state law does it also count in federal law? The answer seems to be yes.
Feds recognises any states felon restoration rights.
This Court finds that Michigan law provides for the automatic reinstatement of all civil rights of convicted felons following release from custody and completion of probation. Thus, once [the defendant] completed his sentence ..., all or essentially all of [his] civil rights-namely, his right to vote, to hold public office, and to serve on a jury-were "restored automatically by the force of the very [Michigan] laws that suspend[ed] them."
Also it seems that any license to possess a firearm is counted as an exclusion from the 1000’ rule. In this case the person had a permit to possess a handgun issued in Michigan and Alabama and was in Alabama school zone. The court said the Michigan permit counted. It also states that if the state is happy with how they handle firearm possession then so is the fed. At least that’s my understanding. Read the decision for your self.
The grand jury's second count against Tait charges him with a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(A) (the "Gun-Free Subparagraph (A) does not apply to the possession of a firearm ... if the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by the State in which the school zone is located or a political subdivision of the State, and the law of the State or political subdivision requires that, before an individual obtains such a license, the law enforcement authorities of the State or political subdivision verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the license....
18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
The Gun-Free School Zone Act dictates that Tait violated federal law via possessing a handgun in a school zone unless Tait was licensed by Alabama, and either Alabama or Escambia County verified that Tait was qualified to receive the license.[suP]5[/suP] As Tait did possess a handgun in a school zone, and Tait was licensed in Alabama, the issue boils down to whether Alabama or Escambia County adequately verified that Tait was qualified to receive the license.
Alabama's licensing requirements are lenient: The sheriff of a county may, upon application of any person residing in that county, issue a qualified or unlimited license to such person to carry a pistol ... if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear injury to his person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol, and that he is a suitable person to be so licensed.
Ala.Code 13A-11-75 (1975). The government argues that Tait's license is void for purposes of 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) for two reasons: first, because Alabama's requirements for verifying an applicants' qualifications are too relaxed to ever qualify their licensees for 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) protections; and second, because Tait was not a suitable person to be licensed under Alabama law. According to the government, these licensing deficiencies resulted in Tait receiving a void license which did not qualify for the exception in 922(q)(2)(B)(ii).
The government first argues that Alabama licenses never qualify for the exception in 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) because Alabama does not require its licensing agents to conduct background checks on firearms license applicants. The 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) exception only applies if "... the law of the State ... requires that ... [the sheriff] verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the license." 18 U.S.C. 922(q)(2)(B)(ii). By its basic terms, the statute merely requires that the Alabama sheriff ensured that Tait was qualified under Alabama law to receive the license. While the Alabama law is extremely lenient, it is nonetheless the only pertinent law. Alabama has chosen its laws, and these are the laws which determine whether the federal statute's exception applies. See Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. at 2011-12, 141 L.Ed.2d 303.[suP]6[/suP] Alabama is free to set forth its own licensing requirements, and Congress chose to defer to those licensing requirements when it established "qualified under law" as its criterion for the exception to the Gun-Free School Zone Act. Therefore the government's first argument with respect to 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) is rejected.[suP]7[/suP]
The government next argues that Tait failed to qualify for an Alabama license, even under Alabama's lax standards, because Tait was not a suitable licensee. The government maintains that Tait was not suitable based on Alabama Code section 13A-11-72(a), which provides: "No person who has been convicted in this state or elsewhere of committing or attempting to commit a crime of violence shall own a pistol or have one in his ... possession or under his ... control." Ala.Code 13A-11-72(a) (1975). The government's argument fails due to a recent Eleventh Circuit opinion, United States v. Fowler, 11th Cir., 1999, 198 F.3d 808 (1999). The Fowler court held, "Without an express limitation on the certificate restoring civil and political rights ..., under Alabama law the restoration of civil and political rights restores the firearm rights limited by 13A-11-72(a)." Id.
The government tries to distinguish Fowler on two bases: first, that the defendant in Fowler received a written pardon restoring his civil rights (whereas Tait's civil rights were restored via operation of Michigan law); and second, that the Fowler case involved the interpretation of 922(g) rather than 922(q). Both distinctions are irrelevant. First, the Supreme Court held in Caron, "Massachusetts restored petitioner's civil rights by operation of law rather than by pardon or the like. This fact makes no difference." Caron, 524 U.S. 308, 118 S.Ct. at 2011, 141 L.Ed.2d 303. The critical issue is whether civil rights were restored unconditionally-not how the civil rights were restored. Tait's civil rights were restored, without reservation; thus Tait is entitled to the same protections as any other person without state-imposed limitations on his civil rights-including the protections of the 922(q)(2)(B)(ii) exception.
As for the government's second point, the fact that this court was evaluating 922(g) rather than 922(q) in Fowler is entirely irrelevant. Utilizing Fowler's line of reasoning, this court holds that Tait's firearms rights were restored for purposes of exceptions to 922(g) as well as 922(q). Fowler held that a felon's right to firearms was completely restored for purposes of removing 13A-11-72(a) limitations. Fowler, 198 F.3d 808. Tait's suitability for firearms licensing was equally restored. To hold otherwise would be non-congruous with Fowler. We therefore hold that the district court properly dismissed Count Two of the indictment against Tait.